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Douglas Edwards is arguably the most prominent contemporary advocate of moderate alethic pluralism. 
Significantly influenced by Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch, his work on the nature of truth has become 
widely discussed in the topical literature. Edwards labels his version of moderate alethic pluralism 
determination pluralism. At first blush, determination pluralism appears philosophically promising. The 
position deserves thoughtful consideration, particularly because of its capacity to accommodate the scope 
problem. I argue, however, that upon analysis the view is better understood as a form of metaphysical dualism 
or what I will call meta-dualism. Furthermore, determination pluralists face a dilemma; there appears to be an 
instability at the core of their dualistic model. On the one horn of the dilemma, they need a clear metaphysical 
demarcation at the interface of their two necessary domains. On the other horn, they seem to need to a 
















Truth pluralism or alethic pluralism is the view “that different properties play important 
roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse” (Edwards 2012, p. 200).1 
These domains involve language about some subject matter; examples of domains are 
physical, biological, social, institutional, moral and mathematical domains. By way of the 
scope problem,2 alethic pluralists argue that there are more than one way domain-relative 
truth bearers can be true. A truth bearer – say a sentence3 – in the physical domain may be 
made true by having the property of correspondence. In non-physical domains a truth bearer 
may be made true by having the property of coherence or superassertibility.4 
                                                     
1 Edwards (2008) points out that the alethic pluralist does not take ‘true’ to be ambiguous: 
although the word ‘true’ is picking out different properties, the alethic pluralist is not charged with 
equivocating on the word ‘true’, as he holds that the meaning of ‘true’, and the concept of truth, are 
held fixed across domains of discourse (p. 148, fn.10). 
“‘True’ is not ambiguous as are ‘stage’, ‘tear’, and ‘still’” notes Wright (2003, p. 78); we can talk of truth 
simpliciter. We do not have to talk of physical truth, moral truth and mathematical truth etc. See also Wright 
(1996) and Lynch (2001). 
2 Russell (2001) puts the problem this way: “if truth consists in a correspondence of thought with something 
outside thought, thought can never know when truth has been attained” (p. 70). If truth consists in coherence, 
“there is no reason to suppose that only one coherent body of beliefs is possible” (p. 71 original emphasis). 
Intuitively speaking, either option is philosophically undesirable. Accordingly, alethic pluralists hold “that 
different theories of truth should be limited in scope, as they each perform well in some domains, but not others” 
(Edwards 2018a, p. 83).See Sher (1998) and Lynch (2009, pp. 32–36) for further detail on what the scope 
problem entails.  
3 For various reasons Edwards prefers to speak of sentences, rather than beliefs or propositions as the truth-apt 
bearers of descriptive content. I adopt his convention here.  
4 Wright explains superassertibility as durable warrant: 
A statement is superassertible. . . if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would 
survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms 
of improvement of our information. (1992, p. 48) 
Alternatively, “〈p〉 is superassertible if and only if 〈p〉 is warranted without defeat at some stage of enquiry, and 
would remain so at every successive stage of enquiry” (Dodd 2013, p. 29 fn.4).  
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Developed by Crispin Wright,5 Michael Lynch and now a new generation including Douglas 
Edwards,6 alethic pluralism is increasingly prominent in the literature. Contemporary alethic 
pluralists are grouped into two camps: strong alethic pluralists and moderate alethic 
pluralists. Strong alethic pluralists hold that truth varies according to domains of discourse; 
there is no unitary meta-truth realized across domains. Moderate alethic pluralists, on the 
other hand, generally argue that micro-truths spread across domains realize or manifest a 
‘higher’ meta-truth (see Pedersen and Wright 2013; Pedersen and C. D. Wright 2018 for 
detail). 
Moderate alethic pluralists assume that, if there are two ways sentences can be true, it follows 
there may be three, four or more ways sentences can be true. Alethic dualism is, therefore, 
usually subsumed under the umbrella of alethic pluralism.7 This seems fair enough. However, 
I will argue that Edwards’ recently developed version of moderate alethic pluralism – 
determination pluralism – is committed to dualism in a further broader way. Determination 
pluralists consider language to be either representational (correspondence truth) or 
constructionist (superassertible truth); and they consider being to be either physical or non-
physical. This implies global dualism: in one domain language represents the physical, in the 
other language constructs the non-physical. This broad dualism cannot be incorporated into a 
meta-pluralist framework I argue. Determination pluralists are, in fact, incorporating their 
pluralistic alethic framework into a meta-dualistic metaphysical framework.  
I will then argue that this dualism appears unstable due to a dilemma at the heart of Edwards’ 
model. The dilemma arises from the fact that determination pluralism only offers two ways 
for language to relate to the world; as dualists, they only offer two domains of discourse 
                                                     
5 Putnam (1994) also entertained a version of truth pluralism at around the same time as Wright. 
6 Other ‘new generation’ truth pluralists include notably Pedersen (2010; 2014) and Ferrari (Ferrari, Lynch and 
Edwards 2015; Ferrari 2018). Horgan and Potrč (2008) and Sher (1998; 2005) develop note-worthy versions of 
correspondence pluralism: truth always consists in correspondence, but there are different ways of 
corresponding. 
7 C. D. Wright notes the various dualisms in alethic pluralism. Alethic pluralists include “‘thin/thick’ or 
‘lightweight/heavyweight’ distinctions among truth properties that have thus far been their hallmark way of 
navigating realist/anti-realist controversies” (Wright, C.D. 2012, p. 98). Pedersen (2014), likewise, recognizes 
dualism to be foundational to alethic pluralism; “the distinction between mind-dependent and mind-
independent existence is crucial” in supporting alethic pluralism (p. 275). 
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about some subject matter. On the one horn of the dilemma, determination pluralists must 
clearly demarcate their two domains. However, if they do, it is difficult to explain why some 
vague cases at the boundary between the two domains appear to contain features from both 
domains. I use the example of the predicate ‘is gay’ that picks out the property of being gay; 
gayness appears to contain both physical and non-physical features. On the other horn of the 
dilemma, determination pluralists cannot accommodate this vague boundary between their 
two domains. I will argue that this is because determination pluralism is foundational on 
having a clear distinction at its core. Determination pluralism (or dualism) collapses if 
unsupported by a clear demarcation between its two global domains. Edwards must choose 
whether gayness is purely physical (i.e. biological) or purely non-physical (i.e. socially 
constructed). Therefore, there is an awkward instability at the centre of the Edwards’s 
universal metaphysical model. 
In part 1 of this paper I introduce Edwards’ determination pluralism as influenced by Wright 
and Lynch. I then explicate the global dualism that overshadows Edwards’ position. In part 
2, I argue that this meta-dualism threatens to destabilise determination pluralism. In part 3, I 
present determination pluralists with a dilemma. Regardless of whether their meta-dualism is 
sharply or vaguely demarcated, they cannot account for tricky boundary cases such as 
gayness. Determination pluralism as currently formulated requires revision. 
(1.) Determination pluralism (or dualism) 
(1.1.) Introducing Edwards’ view 
For Edwards substantive or inflationary truth is at heart significantly different from 
insubstantial or deflated truth. This is, firstly, due to its robust explanatory power and, 
secondly, due to its normative force (Wright 1992, ch.1; Edwards 2018a, pp. 28–29). Truth 
qua property has “metaphysical weight. . . truths form a genuine kind” (Edwards 2018a, p. 
36). Our investigation of the truth-property is mediated by investigation of the concept of 
truth (see Edwards 2016 for detail).The content of this truth-concept – truth’s features – is 
defined by a list of a priori platitudes instead of necessary and sufficient conditions (Wright 
2003, pp. 271–72; Lynch 2009, pp. 8–12; Edwards 2018a, p. 125).8 In other words, a list of 
                                                     
8 For Wright – and for alethic pluralists generally – the platitudes are the starting point for a theory of the nature 
of truth. They are the minimal requirements any metaphysically robust account of truth must meet. The 
platitudes are intuitive though revisable claims constituting the truth concept. Alethic pluralists draw up the list 
in slightly different ways. However, it generally contains platitudes such as (1) to assert a statement is to present 
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pre-theoretic conceptual platitudes exhaustively describes the truth-concept. More than one 
kind of predicate may minimally satisfy the platitudes. 
Edwards’ truth property cannot be reduced to some other property. A sentence possesses the 
truth-property by possessing some other property. Truth is a universal, domain-independent 
property determined by functional, domain-relative properties possessed by all true 
sentences. Roughly, one may think of many domain specific small t truths determining a 
general capital T truth. For Edwards truth is a special – shall we say transcendent – kind of 
property “that has claims to both unity and plurality” (2018a, p. 124).True sentences 
determine the universal truth property if they have the functional domain-relative properties 
of either correspondence or superassertibility.  
Citing Lewis (1983), Edwards distinguishes between sparse versus abundant properties in 
the world (Edwards 2014, ch. 7; 2018a, ch. 4). Sparse properties are universals instantiated 
by two or more objects sharing that property; they form a distinct ontological kind. Sparse 
properties contrast with abundant properties. Abundant properties are any extension of a 
predicate; a predicate that picks out a class of objects that satisfy it. Edwards further claims 
that this sparse/abundant distinction applies to objects as well as to properties. A singular 
term forming an atomic sentence with some predicate refers to either a sparse or an abundant 
object. Universal truth, however, transcends both domain individuation and the 
sparse/abundant dichotomy because truth is itself “a key instrument used to make the 
distinction between sparseness and abundance” (Edwards 2018a, p. 140). Like the traditional 
functionalist notion of multiply-realized, for Edwards truth is multiply-determined.9 
(1.2.) Edwards’ meta-dualism 
In this paper, I am concerned with Edwards’ metaphysics of the relationship between 
language and the world rather than the details truth determination. He draws from Wright and 
Lynch to present a universal metaphysical account of both sentences and facts that I will 
                                                                                                                                                                     
it as true; (2) ‘p’ is true if and only if p; (3) a sentence is true when the world is as the sentence says it is; (4) a 
true sentence should be assertible at any time; (5) true sentences are completely true, not true by degrees; (6) 
truth-apt sentences have truth-apt negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, etc. and (7) truth is a worthy goal of 
inquiry. 
9 By analogy, one can think of truth as winning, and what it takes to win varies depending on what game one is 
playing (Dummett 1978). Like domain-independent truth, winning “transcend[s] any particular features 
regarding what it takes to win any particular game” (Edwards 2018a, p. 123). 
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argue is fundamentally meta-dualistic. Determination pluralism is, therefore, probably better 
construed as determination dualism. To build his global metaphysics, Edwards inspects the 
relationship between properties and predicates via Wright’s notion of width of cosmological 
role. A detailed analysis of this intricate notion is beyond the scope of this paper (see Wright 
1992, pp. 196–99 and Edwards 2018a, pp. 69–76). Briefly, however, Wright (1992) explains 
as follows: 
Let the width of cosmological role of a subject-matter of a discourse be measured to 
the extent to which citing the kinds of states of affairs with which it deals is 
potentially contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our 
being in attitudinal states which take such states of affairs as object (p. 196 original 
emphasis). 
A subject matter has a broad cosmological role if the states of affairs (objects and properties) 
it is concerned with cannot be explained merely in terms of our attitudes (beliefs or values) 
towards those states of affairs. A subject matter has a narrow cosmological role if the states 
of affairs it is concerned with can be explained solely in terms of our attitudes towards them. 
Domains dealing with physical facts are an example of the former; domains dealing with 
moral facts are an example of the latter. Domains of discourse exhibiting a broad 
cosmological role are associated with realism, externalism, representationalism and 
correspondence truth. Domains of discourse exhibiting a narrow cosmological role are 
associated with anti-realism, internalism, non-representationalism and coherence or 
superassertible truth. Edwards (2018a) also notes that “the distinction between narrow and 
broad cosmological role is not a matter of degree” (p. 70, fn. 15). A sentence about some fact 
is either a product of our attitudes or it is not. 
(1.2.1.) Language dualism 
The first component of Edwards’ meta-dualism is language dualism. He divides predicates 
into responsive versus generative kinds. By, in part, exhibiting a broad cosmological role, 
responsive predicates correspond to sparse properties. By exhibiting a narrow cosmological 
role, generative predicates project abundant properties. We have responsive predicates 
because sometimes our language reacts to objective properties “out there”. For example, it 
is because a rod “has the property of being metallic that [the] rod falls under the predicate ‘is 
metallic’” (Edwards 2018a, p. 68). The explanatory work done by reference to an object’s 
being metallic involves reference to the objective fact that being metallic subsists in (broad 
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cosmological role). This entails a “property-to-predicate direction of explanation. . . it is 
because A has the property of being F that A falls under the predicate ‘is F’” (Edwards 
2018a, p. 68 original emphasis).10 
We have generative predicates because sometimes our language creates or constructs 
properties. These abundant properties exist because they are projections of predicates. For 
example, “motorbikes have the property of being cool because motorbikes fall under the 
predicate of ‘is cool’, rather than vice versa” (Edwards 2018a, p. 68). The explanatory work 
done by reference to an object’s coolness involves only the fact that the object is believed to 
be cool (narrow cosmological role). This entails a “predicate-to-property direction of 
explanation. . . it is because A falls under the predicate ‘is F’ that A is F” (Edwards 2018a, p. 
68 original emphasis). It follows that the responsive and the generative models each come 
with their own account of truth.  
Concurrently, Edwards utilizes a representational versus non-representational domain 
distinction (introduced by Lynch 2009, pp. 52–53). Realist domains of discourse have a 
representational truth-predicate such as correspondence. Anti-realist domains of discourse 
have a non-representational truth-predicate such as superassertibility. In representational 
domains, if two individuals make conflicting truth-claims, then at least one of them has 
erred. In non-representational domains, there may be faultless disagreement about truth-
claims. An example of the former is truth by correspondence in the domain of physical 
subject matter; an example of the latter is truth by superassertibility in the domain of moral 
subject matter. 
Representational truth is dependent on prior states of affairs existent in the world. The 
reference relationship between a sentence and the world exists prior to truth. The physical 
world is as it is regardless of our alethic constructions. Non-representational truth is 
contextual; it creates states of affairs. Truth is inherently dependent on us: dependent on the 
structure of our linguistic system and what we value. These distinctions entail metaphysical 
dualism, and the only way “to preserve the availability of both the sparse and abundant 
models in different domains is to hold that truth comes in at least two general forms” 
(Edwards 2018a, p. 88).  
                                                     
10 Classification of singular terms in relation to objects mirrors Edwards’ classification of predicates in relation 
to properties. I focus here on predicates and properties however because the predicate in a sentence, rather than 
the singular term determines the domain membership of a sentence (Edwards 2018a, p. 78; 2018b, p. 97). 
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In representational domains, true sentences correspond to mind-independent sparse 
properties. In non-representational domains, true sentences by being superassertible project 
mind-dependent abundant properties. Examples of responsive predicates – exhibiting a broad 
cosmological role – are physical predicates (‘is wet’), chemical predicates (‘is acidic’) and 
biological predicates (‘is an enzyme’). Examples of generative predicates – exhibiting a 
narrow cosmological role – are institutional predicates (‘is the governor of New York’), 
social predicates (‘is black’ or ‘is a woman’) and moral predicates (‘is right’ or ‘is wrong’). 
Each predicate should be examined on a case-by-case basis to establish whether it is 
responsive or generative (Edwards 2018a, ch. 4). Edwards concludes that 
truth has to be understood differently in different domains, for we cannot get the 
general distinctions we made between different domains in terms of sparseness and 
abundance up and running without a pluralist approach to truth (2018a, p. 83 original 
emphasis). 
(1.2.2.) Ontological dualism 
The second component of Edwards’ meta-dualism is ontological dualism. He suggests that 
pluralism offers the  
most plausible route for those who both want to investigate the nature of existence 
and also want to be open to the idea that both abstract and concrete objects exist 
(Cotnoir and Edwards 2015, pp. 10–11). 
Edwards argues that truth pluralism motivates ontological pluralism, and, therefore, global 
pluralism about the relationship between language and the world.11 What we can say about 
the nature of being varies from one kind of property (or object) to the next depending, in 
part, on whether the subject matter is concrete or abstract. As before, this sounds more like 
dualism than pluralism. In realist representational domains (physical and chemical, for 
example) the concrete world has casual powers to which true sentences respond. In anti-
realist non-representational domains (social, institutional, mathematical and moral) true 
sentences construct the abstract world. Moreover, being has the same essential 
characteristics as truth. It is a universal transcendent multiply-determined property that is 
neither sparse nor abundant. Therefore, mutatis mutandis, global dualism or what I am 
                                                     




calling meta-dualism follows. This meta-dualism involves two global meta-domains 
incorporating both truth and being. One can illustrate Edwards’ global dualism as follows: 
Constructionist meta-domain: generative language           abundant ontology (non-physical) 
Representational meta-domain: responsive language           sparse ontology (physical) 
Although purportedly inspired by the distinctions in Wright and Lynch’s alethic pluralism, 
Edwards’ model involves ontological and then global dualism built on top of a theory of 
truth dualism. I will suggest in the next section that Edwards therefore carries a special 
philosophical burden. This is to explain exactly why and how physical, chemical and 
biological domains belong on one side of the meta-domain divide; while moral, 
mathematical, institutional and social domains belong on the other side. I argue, however, 
that determination pluralism cannot meet this burden. A vague boundary at the interface of 
the two domains seems required. This blurring, however, introduces problems of its own. A 
dilemma then surfaces: the interface between determination pluralism’s two meta-domains 
can be neither sharpened nor blurred. 
(2.) An instability in determination pluralism 
Having explicated the meta-dualism in determination pluralism, I will now discuss a 
potentially destabilising problem at the core of the view. Like any dualist Edwards, draws a 
necessary demarcation between two domains that presents a target of attack for monists. 
These two domains are his representational and constructionist meta-domains about the 
relationship between language and the world illustrated above. In what follows I claim that 
Edwards faces a dilemma; either there must be a sharp boundary at the interface of his two 
meta-domains or there must be a fuzzy boundary. I argue that either option is untenable 
given the way he formulates his view. The dilemma threatens the stability of determination 
pluralism. 
I make my case in three steps. Firstly, I suggest that there must be a sharp demarcation 
between determination pluralism’s responsive and generative predicate meta-kinds. 
Secondly, however, due to tricky cases at the interface of responsive and generative 
predicate meta-kinds, it seems a vague boundary in needed. The third step follows from the 
previous two steps; determination pluralists face a dilemma. I conclude that Edwards’ meta-
dualism appears metaphysically unstable.  
(2.1.) A sharp distinction is needed 
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As stated above, Edwards demarcates sparse from abundant properties. For our purposes 
here, however, my concern is with Edwards’ associated predicate distinction. When it 
comes to demarcating responsive from generative predicates (that pick out sparse and 
abundant properties respectively) he proceeds as follows:  
predicates come in different kinds, and. . . predicate kinds are distinguished by the 
kinds of functional roles that predicates have. . . These are intended to mark fairly 
intuitive distinctions between kinds of subject-matter (2018a, p. 61, 63).  
Edwards discusses how moral and religious predicate kinds, for example, seem to overlap 
(2018a, p. 63). Nonetheless, he suggests that with some philosophical work, distinctions can 
be drawn according to the functions these predicates perform (Edwards 2018a, pp. 88–89).12 
Edwards mentions many predicate kinds (physical, chemical, biological, social, institutional, 
mathematical, moral etc.). Let us call these micro-kinds. However, as indicated above, he 
classifies these micro-kinds into what one may think of as two meta-kinds: responsive and 
generative predicates. According to the criteria already introduced, physical and chemical 
predicates clearly lie on the responsive side of the demarcation, while mathematical and 
moral predicates clearly lie on the generative side. As we will see, however, things get 
somewhat murky at the interface of the biological and social domains. 
Edwards allows room for debate about where and how predicate micro-kind distinctions are 
drawn; “there may be many different reasons why we might want to make these distinctions” 
(Edwards 2018a, p. 66). This implies that, depending on context, there are different ways to 
individuate predicate kinds. Edwards, therefore, tolerates a degree of metaphysical vagueness 
or blurring at the boundaries of the predicate micro-kinds. Prima facie, this must be the case. 
Articulating a sharp demarcation between biological and chemical kinds or between 
institutional and social kinds, for example, is notoriously problematic (see Eronen 2015 and 
Potochnick and McGill 2012). A continuum of degrees of ‘kindness’ seems more appropriate 
than a spectrum of sharply individuated kinds (see Wimsatt 1994). Lynch (2001) agrees: 
                                                     
12 It is not clear how this can be done in a non-question begging way. If demarcations between predicate kinds 
are drawn by intuition, then the question becomes ‘whose intuitions?’ Edwards’ uses his own rather than 
empirical data from the general population. See Ulatowski (2017) for a convincing case that philosophers 
researching truth should utilize x-phi-style surveys, rather than personal judgements particularly when it comes 
to establishing conceptual premises viz. functional platitudes. 
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We should not expect there to be a sharp and clear line between discourses or forms 
of thought. . . sometimes we may say things that don’t clearly fall into either 
category. . . It follows that we should expect some vagueness as to what discourse a 
particular proposition belongs (p. 733). 
Moreover, “[i]f what I say, the proposition I express, is not clearly a member of one 
discourse or another, how its truth is realized will also be unclear” (Lynch 2001, p. 734). As 
we will see, however, this vagueness or grading between micro-kinds is not apt for the 
delineation of Edward’s two predicate meta-kinds. In a similar context, Wright discusses 
vague, borderline cases on the colour spectrum. For a shade of colour to 
lie on the borderline between red and purple is for it to enjoy a status consistent both 
with its being red and with its being purple – not a third kind of status, inconsistent 
with both (Wright 2003, p. 74 original emphasis). 
This tactic cannot work for Edwards’ binary meta-kinds however. There is an inherently 
qualitative, rather than a merely quantitative difference between his two predicate meta-
kinds. This is because they are fundamentally distinct in their core metaphysical 
composition. As just intimated, one can allow for vagueness between chemical and 
biological predicate kinds for example; both fall within the responsive predicate meta-kind 
domain. The same goes for institutional and social predicate kinds; both fall within the 
generative predicate meta-kind domain. However, it seems one cannot allow any vagueness 
between the predicate meta-kinds themselves. This is because responsiveness and 
generativenessare by Edwards’ own criteria metaphysically antithetical. In the former case 
predicates react; they are passive. In the latter case predicates create; they are active. The 
meta-kinds are functional opposites; they are mutually incompatible. Metaphysically 
speaking, there is no standardly conceivable way to merge the two by blurring the 
boundary.13 Saying that meta-kind borderline cases can enjoy a status that is both responsive 
and generative is akin to saying that a predicate can contain antithetical metaphysical 
                                                     
13Edwards’ claim that a we should draw distinctions on a case-by-case basis is not helpful. This only invokes a 
further question of what criteria to use when deciding cases. Whatever criteria one stipulates will implicitly 
draw the necessary distinction. This is a famous problem for epistemic pluralists. They cannot appeal to a 
‘higher’ principle to decide disagreements since this would introduce a forbidden meta-criteria offensive to the 
diversity intrinsic in their view.  
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properties. Holding this kind of contradictory metaphysics is akin to concurrently believing 
both ‘p’ and ‘not p’. 
The predicate meta-kind distinction carries the metaphysical weight of Edwards’ global 
dualism. This is because his predicate meta-kind distinction supports an identical singular 
term distinction and, therefore, language dualism. The predicate distinction also supports 
property dualism, while the singular term distinction supports object dualism. In other 
words, language dualism (responsive versus generative language) supports ontological 
dualism (sparse versus abundant being). Language dualism in conjunction with ontological 
dualism then ultimately supports global dualism or meta-dualism. We have a nested 
metaphysical hierarchy built from a distinction about predicates all the way up to meta-
dualism. In other words, if a sharp predicate meta-kind distinction is necessary, a sharp 
property meta-kind-distinction is necessary and so on all the way up to a sharp global meta-
domain distinction. Without clear predicate meta-kind individuation, Edwards’ entire 
metaphysical structure appears unstable. 
(2.2.) A vague distinction is needed 
I have argued that there cannot be a graded boundary at the interface of determination 
pluralism’s two meta-domains. Recall that one meta-domain – the representational meta-
domain – contains responsive language reacting to a sparse ontology; the other meta-domain 
– the constructionist meta-domain – contains generative language creating an abundant 
ontology. Although Edwards is not explicit about it, the interface between the two meta-
domains surely lies somewhere about where the biological domain interfaces with the social 
domain. The biological domain contains responsive language representing the physical 
world; the social domain contains generative language creating a constructed ontology.  
In his writings, Edwards is particularly concerned with the metaphysics of race and gender 
predicates and properties. He asserts the following about biological predicate kinds versus 
social predicate kinds:  
Part of the functional role of biological predicates is to. . . discern different kinds in 
nature. . . without imposing any sort of privilege or subjugation of different kinds of 
organisms. Social predicates, on the other hand, are. . . concerned with describing and 




It follows that biological predicates – ‘is a catalyst’ and ‘is an enzyme’ – are responsive, 
while social predicates – ‘is black’ and ‘is a woman’– are generative (Edwards 2018a, p. 
66).14 The former pick out mind-independent properties without the taint of privilege or 
subjugation; the latter pick out mind-dependent properties where power relations and the 
like come to the fore. Unfortunately, however, we are not told where exactly the border lies 
between responsive predicates reacting to mind-independent properties and generative 
predicates creating mind-dependent properties. One wonders whether predicates such as ‘is 
disabled’, ‘is talented’ and ‘is gay’ are responsive (i.e. represent biological properties) or 
generative (i.e. construct social properties). Running these borderline cases through 
Edwards’ model does not produce an obvious outcome. Determination pluralism seems 
unable to account for these tricky cases at the interface of the two predicate meta-kinds. 
‘Is gay’, for example, cannot be solely responsive by Edwards’ criteria. ‘Is gay’ obviously 
has associations with subjugation, power and so on. A brief glance at human history or at 
any newspaper will attest to the underprivileged social role gay persons generally play. 
Ostensibly, however, ‘is gay’ cannot be solely generative either. There is strong empirical 
confirmation that ‘is gay’ has biological associations. A large-scale study published recently 
in Science (Ganna et al. 2019) is one of many convincing research projects finding same-sex 
sexual orientation to have a significant genetic component even if there is no single gay 
gene (see also Mills 2019 for commentary on the study).15 The functional role of ‘is gay’ 
cannot be explained solely in terms of objective biological phenomena (responsive 
predicates/wide cosmological role) nor solely in terms of our attitudes and beliefs 
(generative predicates/narrow cosmological role). ‘Is gay’ neither picks out a strictly 
physical property nor a strictly non-physical property. Gayness, it seems, has elements of 
both mind-independence and mind-dependence. This option is, however, not available to the 
meta-kind dualist; there cannot be a little bit of both. As I argued in the previous section, 
Edwards must specify whether a given predicate is solely responsive versus solely 
generative. 
                                                     
14 Edwards makes a point of citing Haslanger’s (2012) suggestion that the notion of sex, as well as gender, may 
be socially constructed (Edwards 2018a, p. 65 fn. 5), and also Appiah’s (1994) suggestion that the notion of 
morphological geographical human groups, as well as races, are not biological kinds (Edwards 2018a, pp. 73–
74). 
15 Gay persons, themselves, also generally testify ‘I was born this way’.  
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In his writings, Edwards only mentions easy predicate kind individuation cases. He only 
discusses cases that uncontroversially lie on one side or the other of the predicate meta-kind 
demarcation. Nonetheless, predicates like ‘is gay’, ‘is disabled’ and ‘is talented’ appear to 
contain elements of both.16 However, admitting that these cases are to some degree both 
responsive and generative is not an option for determination pluralists. Doing so would 
necessitate blurring over the boundary between their two predicate meta-kinds. This would, 
in turn, involve abandoning the dualism their global metaphysics of language and the world 
is predicated upon.  
We appear to be on a slippery slope. Perhaps any predicate picking out one of our human 
properties carries some biologically represented aspects and some socially constructed 
aspects.17 Moreover, if there is no clear predicate demarcation here, then plausibly some 
aspects of both representation and construction may apply to any predicate we relate to any 
                                                     
16 James (1907) uses the examples of health, wealth and strength while making has famous case for a pragmatist 
conception of truth. He argues that these cases, like truth, are hard to categorize as either strictly realist (ante 
rem) or anti-realist (post rem). He concludes that: 
just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued 
because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the 
course of experience. . . Truth exists ante rem just as much and as little as the other things do (pp. 83–
84). 
The predicates ‘is healthy’, ‘is wealthy’ and ‘is strong’ – like ‘is disabled’, ‘is talented’ and ‘is gay’– are not 
easy to classify as strictly responsive or strictly generative. Edwards does, however, cite Hacking (1999) who 
categorizes the properties of being fat, being anorexic and being a genius as “looping kinds” (Edwards 2018a, p. 
103). As before, however, Edwards does not mention whether he considers ‘is fat’, ‘is anorexic’ and ‘is a 
genius’ to fall into the responsive or the generative predicate meta-kind domain. Nothing in his work suggests 
that he holds there to be three predicate kinds: responsive, generative and looping kinds. 
17 See also Hales (2018), who has similar concerns about Edwards’ predicate and property dualism. Hales 
argues persuasively that defining human properties is always contextual and vague. Likewise, human predicates 
– such as ‘is tall’ or ‘is a woman’ – have an underlying physical determinant albeit with socially constructed 
elements. Both Hales and I are presenting versions of Sorites paradox as a challenge to determination pluralism. 
When is a heap of grain a heap? See Smith (2008) for more detail on Sorites paradox and on vague predicates in 
general. Soritoricality does not generally present a problem in everyday speech nor for metaphysical monists 
and global reductionists. However, it does present a problem for someone like Edwards who draws a clear 
predicate kind distinction, then builds a metaphysical model of universal dualism thereupon. 
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property in the world.18 According to Duhem (1954), our background beliefs always affect 
the conclusions we draw from observations of nature. Convincing arguments made by Quine 
(1951) and Davidson (1984) for semantic holism also suggest that predicate dualism is 
untenable. Since any observation sentence is theory-laden, “our statements about the external 
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” 
(Quine 1951, p. 41). For Kuhn (1996), statements about the world depend, in part, on our 
prior assumptions for their meaning and conditions of application. These assumptions include 
the sorts of values and biases about race and gender Edwards is concerned with. Putnam 
(1981), similarly, denies that 
it makes sense to ask whether our concepts ‘match’ something totally uncontaminated 
by conceptualization. . . The very [empirical] inputs upon which our knowledge is 
based are conceptually contaminated. . . Our conceptions. . . are by no means ‘value 
free’ (p. 54).  
As soon as we use language to categorize and label the world, it seems, we introduce “the 
human stain” (Roth 2000). In other words, anything we say about the world carries some 
aspects of construction albeit often only to some small degree.19 Rorty (1995) notices a 
similar problem. Objecting specifically to Wright, he argues convincingly for a naturalized 
approach to smoothing over the traditional subject-object demarcation. Rorty criticizes 
Wright’s distinction “between a cognitive nature or level and a noncognitive nature or level. . 
. between scheme and content, or between subject and object” (Rorty 1995, p. 285, fn.53). 
Rorty concludes that 
James’s and Dewey’s post-Darwinian attempt to naturalize our self-image by 
dissolving the traditional oppositions between mind and nature and between subject 
and object, as well as Davidson’s later assault on the scheme-content distinction, are 
both nicely epitomized in the claim that our perspective on the truth predicate should 
not be ‘seriously dyadic’ (1995, pp. 268–69). 
                                                     
18This is a claim regularly made by anti-realists of various stripes. It is also an often-repeated gripe post-
modernist have with the general analytic approach in philosophy (see Rorty1989, ch.1; Foucault 1994, ch. 9). It 
is a justified concern that should give analytical dualists – like Wright, Lynch and Edwards – pause for revision. 
19 Anti-realists in the philosophy of science, for example, generally argue that the whole of the unobservable 
world is socially constructed in some or other way. The unobservable world consists of genes, carbon atoms and 
electrons for example. Van Fraassen (2008) refers to these as “public hallucinations”.  
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A possible solution to the slippery slope would be to stipulate that each predicate resides on 
a metaphysical continuum of degrees of responsiveness versus generativeness. This 
continuum could, perhaps, be articulated in terms of Lewis’ notion of property naturalness 
(Lewis 1983).20 If applied to biological and social kinds, one could proceed as follows. At 
the one end, this predicate continuum could have untainted categorization of natural kinds 
(‘pure’ representation); at the other end, could be description of absolute privilege and 
subjugation (‘pure’ construction). Perhaps this continuum could then be metaphysically 
‘tethered’ in some way to Lewis’ property naturalness continuum. We would then have a 
magnitudinal continuum of degrees of representational versus constructionist predicate 
kindness. My intuition, however, is that determination pluralists will not find this alternative 
appealing. Blurring over their predicate meta-kind distinction would involve abandoning 
global dualism because of the metaphysical nesting mentioned above. Although apparently 
needed, a predicate continuum would be anathema to determination dualism.  
(3.) The dilemma 
The topic of distinctions versus continuums introduces the next issue I would like to discuss. 
Premised on the arguments from the previous two sections, a dilemma now threatens 
determination pluralism’s overall metaphysics. We have focused on predicates. As 
mentioned, however, Edwards extends his predicate dualism to language dualism, then 
ontological dualism and finally global dualism. I now broaden our focus from predicates to 
domains to reveal a potentially destabilising dilemma at the heart of determination 
pluralism’s universal metaphysics. 
Alethic pluralists, like Wright and Lynch, generally posit a multiplicity of domains of 
discourse characterized by subject matter (e.g. chemical, biological, social and institutional 
domains). Let us call these micro-domains. Each micro-domain contains singular term and 
predicate micro-kinds relating respectively to object and property micro-kinds. In the same 
                                                     
20 According to Lewis, naturalness is a feature of properties; properties can be more or less natural. Naturalness 
comes in degrees approximating to metaphysical fundamentality. Edwards (2013) considers that the truth 
property itself may have a high degree of naturalness (see also his 2014, pp. 130–35). However, he does not 
translate Lewis’ property notion over to predicates in the way I am suggesting. He does cite Smith (2013) who 
gives an account of the descriptive content of predicates in terms of degrees of thickness and thinness. Edwards, 
however, rejects this option. He insists that determination pluralism’s distinction between responsive and 
generative predicates is not graded in that way (Edwards 2018b, p. 94).  
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way that Edwards divides the many micro-kinds into two meta-kinds, he also divides the 
many micro-domains into two meta-domains depending on how truth is determined. These 
are the representational and the constructionist meta-domains already introduced: 
Constructionist meta-domain: generative language           abundant ontology (non-physical) 
Representational meta-domain: responsive language           sparse ontology (physical) 
As per Lynch, some micro-domains (e.g. chemical and biological) fall into the 
representational meta-domain; other micro-domains (e.g. social and institutional) fall into 
the constructionist meta-domain. In representational cases the direction of determination is 
from the world to language (facts make sentences true); in constructionist cases the direction 
of determination is from language to world (true sentences create facts). There is a 
metaphysically reversed order of determination: object-to-subject in the former case, 
subject-to-object in the latter case. In other words, there is a 180-degree about-turn in the 
way that sentences (singular terms and predicates) and the world (objects and properties) 
relate to each another. At various times Edwards calls this direction of dependency between 
sentences and the world either “the order of determination” (2018a, p. 68), the “direction of 
explanation” (p. 68) or the “direction of the truth principle” (p. 88). Approximately, domains 
with so-called concrete subject matter make up the representational meta-domain where 
facts in the world determine our speech; domains with abstract subject matter make up the 
non-representational meta-domain where our speech determines facts in the world (Edwards 
2018a, pp. 112–14).  
As before, Edwards cannot claim there is a vague or blurred boundary between the 
representational versus non-representational meta-domains. Like the two predicate meta-
kinds, the two meta-domains must have a sharp demarcation at their interface. Two domains 
containing juxtaposed metaphysical orders of determination – from sentence to world or 
vice versa – cannot be merged at the interface of the two (not by any conventional 
metaphysics anyway). The completely reversed order of determination between language 
and the world in the two meta-domains makes it necessarily the case that they cannot have a 
vague boundary. The core feature of the responsive model is the object-to-subject (world-to-
language) order of determination. The core feature of the generative model is the subject-to-
object (language-to-word) order of determination. The 180-degree about-turn in direction of 
determination, not only defines, but constitutes the metaphysical essence of the two meta-
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domains. There cannot be a vague boundary between the two meta-domains when they 
perform binary primary functions. 
As already intimated, Edwards’ nested series of distinctions – from predicate dualism to 
global dualism – carries the weight of his overall model. It follows that for determination 
pluralism to be a substantial theory, there must be clear metaphysical meta-domain 
individuation.21 Considering its central role, it is surprising Edwards overlooks detailed 
discussion of the meta-domain distinction in his writings. Where exactly does this boundary 
between a world-to-language domain and a language-to-world domain lie? As far as I can 
tell, the boundary between the two – if there is one – must lie somewhere about where the 
traditional concrete/abstract or body/mind demarcation should be: somewhere with(in) us. It 
seems to lie about where Edwards’ biological and social micro-domains interface.  
Key metaphysical questions about the will and the self – not to mention belief, knowledge 
and meaning – are often explored around this crucial intersection of the biological and the 
social. However, one can only speculate how determination pluralism accounts for these 
issues since Edwards does not discuss where and how the biological and the social interface. 
This is, I suppose, the area of alethic discourse we care about most intimately. Edwards is 
unfortunately silent when it really matters. For determination pluralism to be a robust and 
convincing account of language and the world, there needs to be precise individuation and 
articulation of the two meta-domains. Alternatively, Edwards could grade over the 
distinction between the meta-domains. He would, thereby, abandon meta-dualism for holism 
and adopt metaphysical continuums viz. degrees of physical representation versus social 
construction.22 
A dilemma, therefore, surfaces. On the one horn, there must be a strict demarcation between 
the two meta-domains due to their antithetical orders of determination between language 
                                                     
21 Edwards (2018b) has endeavoured to give an account of the metaphysics of domains. However, he only 
discusses how one may, in principle, individuate what I have called micro-domains (physical, biological, moral, 
mathematical etc.). He does not account for individuation of the two meta-domains (representational versus 
constructionist).  
22  These problems with Edwards’ dualism should concern other alethic pluralists – like Wright, Lynch, 
Pedersen and Ferrari – who likewise group predicates into two meta-kinds and also metaphysical domains into 




and the world. However, if determination pluralists draw a sharp boundary between the 
representational and the constructionist meta-domains, a seemingly impossible task follows. 
This would involve clearly stipulating whether tricky cases – like the predicate ‘is gay’ that 
picks out the property of being gay – are solely mind-independent or solely mind-dependent. 
Does gayness belong in the representational or the constructionist meta-domain? Opting for 
the former requires denying that subjugation, power and the like play a role in what being 
gay entails. Opting for the latter requires contradicting convincing empirical evidence that 
genetics plays a role in being gay. Either option appears philosophically untenable. 
On the other horn of the dilemma, if determination pluralists blur over their meta-domain 
distinction – if gayness contains both physical and non-physical features – then they 
abandon dualism. Giving up dualism, however, would precede giving up determination 
pluralism. This is because of the nested series of sharp distinctions that support 
determination pluralism qua global metaphysical model. Edwards’ position in its current 
collapses without metaphysical dualism. Giving up dualism is, therefore, obviously not an 
appealing option for determination pluralists. 
Conclusion 
I have summarized Douglas Edwards’ recently developed version of moderate alethic 
pluralism: determination pluralism. I looked specifically at his universal metaphysical 
account of the relationship between language and the world. I explained how determination 
pluralism is innately dualistic. I argued that for this position to hang together, determination 
pluralists must either clearly articulate the distinction between their two necessary domains 
or they must allow for a blurring at the boundary. This naturally leads to a dilemma.  
Determination pluralism has several strengths. Most salient is its capacity to deal with the 
scope problem. Intuitively, the same kind of truth does not seem applicable to physical, 
mathematical and moral discourse. However, the position as currently formulated appears to 
contain a metaphysical instability.23 The dualism intrinsic to Edwards’ position needs a clear 
                                                     
23Tappolet (1997; 2000) presents what has come to be known as the instability challenge to alethic pluralism. 
This challenge relates to an inconsistency in maintaining that there is a plurality of truth properties T1 ... Tn. 
Each of these truth properties will have in common the alethic property Tu: the property of being true in one of 
the ways T1 ... Tn. Therefore, alethic pluralism is committed to a universal truth property Tu, and the plurality of 
truth properties T1 ... Tn are superfluous; “the question arises [why the] further way of being true is not the only 
one we need” (Tappolet 2000, p. 385) (see Pedersen 2010 for one possible solution). Although philosophically 
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distinction, yet at the same time needs a vague distinction. The challenge is to somehow 
develop a version of determination pluralism free from this distinction instability at its 
centre. 
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